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*Committee on Industry, Research and Energy*

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**2013/0340(NLE)**

7.3.2014

# **COMPROMISE AMENDMENTS**

## **1 - 8**

**Draft report**  
**Romana Jordan**  
(PE526.123v02-00)

on the proposal for a Council directive amending Directive  
2009/71/EURATOM establishing a Community framework for the nuclear  
safety of nuclear installations

Proposal for a directive  
(COM(2013)0715 – C7-0385/2013 – 2013/0340(NLE))

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PE530.030v02-00

**EN**

*United in diversity*

**EN**

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## Amendment 1

**EPP,S&D, ALDE. ECR, GUE, EFD**

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 94, 95  
Amendments 96 falls

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 1 – point 4

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 3 – paragraph 12

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

'reasonably **achievable**' means that, in addition to meeting the requirements of good practice in engineering, further safety or risk reduction measures for the design, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation should be sought and that these measures should be implemented unless **it can be demonstrated** that they are grossly disproportionate with regard to the safety benefit they would confer;

#### *Amendment*

'reasonably **practicable**' means that, in addition to meeting the requirements of good practice in engineering, further safety or risk reduction measures for the design, commissioning, operation or decommissioning of a nuclear installation should be sought and that these measures should be implemented unless **the national regulatory authority accepts** that they are **demonstrated to be** grossly disproportionate with regard to the safety benefit they would confer;

*(“reasonably achievable” would be replaced by “reasonably practicable” horizontally throughout the text)*

Or. en

## Amendment 2

**EPP, S&D, ALDE. ECR, GUE, EFD**

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 16, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 1 – point 9

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 8

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

Transparency

1. Member States shall ensure that up to date **and timely** information in relation to nuclear safety of nuclear installations and

#### *Amendment*

Transparency

1. Member States shall ensure that up to date information in relation to nuclear safety of nuclear installations and related

related risks is made available to workers and the general public, with specific consideration to those living in the vicinity of a nuclear installation.

The obligation established in the first subparagraph includes ensuring that the competent regulatory authority and the licence holders, within their fields of responsibility, develop, publish and implement a transparency strategy covering, inter alia, information on normal operating conditions of nuclear installations, **non-mandatory** consultation activities with the workers and the general public and communication in case of **abnormal events** and accidents.

2. Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with applicable Union and national legislation and international obligations, provided that this does not jeopardise other overriding interests, such as security, recognised in national legislation or international obligations.

3. Member States shall ensure that the public shall be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the **licensing process** of nuclear installations, in accordance with relevant Union and national legislation and international obligations.

risks is made available to workers and the general public **without undue delay**, with specific consideration to those living in the vicinity of a nuclear installation. **A widespread and transparent communication process shall be ensured including, where appropriate, by regular information and consultation of citizens.**

The obligation established in the first subparagraph includes ensuring that the competent regulatory authority and the licence holders, within their fields of responsibility, develop, publish and implement a transparency strategy covering, inter alia, information on normal operating conditions of nuclear installations, consultation activities with the workers, **where appropriate**, and the general public, and **immediate** communication in case of **incidents** and accidents. **It shall cover as well significant information such as siting, construction, extension, commissioning, operation, operation beyond design service life, final shutdown and decommissioning.**

2. Information shall be made available to the public in accordance with applicable Union and national legislation and international obligations, provided that this does not jeopardise other overriding interests, such as security, recognised in national legislation or international obligations.

3. Member States shall ensure that the public shall be given early and effective opportunities to participate in the **environmental impact assessment** of nuclear installations, in accordance with relevant Union and national legislation and international obligations, **in particular the Aarhus convention.**

Or. en

### Amendment 3

EPP,S&D, ALDE. Greens, ECR, GUE, EFD

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 17-20, 134-137,141-143

Amendments 138, 139, 140 fall

### Proposal for a directive

#### Article 1 – point 10

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 8a

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

Safety objective for nuclear installations

1. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that nuclear installations are designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned with the objective of **avoiding potential** radioactive releases by:

(a) practically eliminating the occurrence of all accident sequences which would lead to early or large releases;

(b) **for accidents that have not been practically eliminated**, implementing design measures so that only limited protective measures in area and time are needed for the public and that sufficient time is available to implement these measures, and that the frequency of such accidents is minimised.

2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the objective set out in paragraph 1 applies to existing nuclear installations to the extent reasonably **achievable**.

#### *Amendment*

Safety objective for nuclear installations

1. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that nuclear installations are designed, sited, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned with the objective of **preventing accidents and radioactive releases and, should an accident occur, mitigating its effects and preventing** radioactive releases **and large, long-term, off-site contamination** by:

(a) practically eliminating the occurrence of all accident sequences which would lead to early or large releases **to a level as low as reasonably practicable**;

(b) **in the event of an accident**, implementing design measures so that only limited protective measures in area and time are needed for the public and that sufficient time is available to implement these measures, and that the frequency of such accidents is minimised.

2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the objective set out in paragraph 1 applies **in full to nuclear installations for which a construction license is granted for the first time after the (...) and** to existing nuclear installations to the extent reasonably **practicable**.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 4**

**EPP, S&D, ALDE, ECR, GUE, EFD**

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 21-25, 144, 145, 148-151

Amendments 146-147 fall

#### **Proposal for a directive**

##### **Article 1 – point 10**

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 8b

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

Implementation of the safety objective for nuclear installations

In order to achieve the safety objective set out in Article 8a, Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that nuclear installations are:

(a) sited so that due consideration is provided to **avoid, where possible**, external natural and man-made hazards and minimise their impact;

(b) designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned based on the defence-in-depth concept so that:

(i) radiation doses to workers and the general public do not exceed **prescribed** limits and are kept as low as reasonably **achievable**;

(ii) the occurrence of **abnormal events** is minimised;

(iii) the potential for escalation to accident situations is reduced by enhancing the nuclear installations' capability to effectively manage and control **abnormal events**;

(iv) harmful consequences of **abnormal events** and design basis accidents, should they occur, are mitigated to ensure that they induce no off-site radiological impact, or only minor radiological impact;

(v) external natural and man-made hazards **are avoided, where possible**, and their

#### *Amendment*

Implementation of the safety objective for nuclear installations

In order to achieve the safety objective set out in Article 8a, Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that nuclear installations are:

(a) sited so that due consideration is provided to **prevent** external natural and man-made hazards and minimise their impact;

(b) designed, constructed, commissioned, operated and decommissioned based on the defence-in-depth concept so that:

(i) radiation doses to workers and the general public do not exceed **authorised** limits and are kept as low as reasonably **practicable**;

(ii) the occurrence of **incidents** is minimised;

(iii) the potential for escalation to accident situations is reduced by enhancing the nuclear installations' capability to effectively manage and control **incidents should they nevertheless occur**;

(iv) harmful consequences of **incidents** and design basis accidents, should they **nevertheless** occur, are mitigated to ensure that they induce no off-site radiological impact, or only minor radiological impact;

(v) **the frequency of** external natural and man-made hazards **is minimised**, and their

impact is *minimised*.

impact is *as low as reasonably practicable*.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 5**

**EPP, S&D, ALDE, Greens, ECR, GUE, EFD**

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 152, 154, 155, 157, 159

Amendments 156 falls

Amendments 153, 158 voted as addition

#### **Proposal for a directive**

##### **Article 1 – point 10**

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 8c

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

Methodology for siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations

1. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the licence holder, under the supervision of the competent regulatory authority:

(a) regularly evaluates the radiological impact of a nuclear installation on workers, the general public and air, water and soil, in both normal operating and in both operating and accident conditions;

(b) defines, documents and re-assesses regularly and at least every *ten* years, the design basis of nuclear installations through a periodic safety review, and supplements it by a design extension analysis, to ensure that all reasonably practicable improvement measures are implemented;

(c) ensures that the design extension analysis covers all accidents, events and combination of events, including internal and external natural or man-made hazards and severe accidents, leading to conditions not included in the design basis accidents;

#### *Amendment*

Methodology for siting, design, construction, commissioning, operation and decommissioning of nuclear installations

1. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the licence holder, under the supervision of the competent regulatory authority:

(a) regularly evaluates the radiological impact of a nuclear installation on workers, the general public and air, water and soil, in both normal operating and in both operating and accident conditions;

(b) defines, documents and re-assesses regularly and at least every *eight* years, the design basis of nuclear installations through a periodic safety review, and supplements it by a design extension analysis, to ensure that all reasonably practicable improvement measures are implemented;

(c) ensures that the design extension analysis covers all accidents, events and combination of events, including internal and external natural or man-made hazards and severe accidents, leading to conditions not included in the design basis accidents;

(d) establishes and implements strategies to mitigate both design basis and beyond-design basis accidents;

(e) implements Severe Accident Management Guidelines for all nuclear power plants and, if appropriate, other nuclear installations, covering all operational conditions, accidents in the spent fuel pools and long-duration events;

(f) carries out a specific safety review for nuclear installations which the competent regulatory authority considers to be close to the limit of their operating lifetime as originally foreseen, and for which an extension of the lifetime is requested.

2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the granting or the review of a licence to construct and/or operate a nuclear installation should be based upon an appropriate site- and installation-specific safety assessment.

3. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires, for nuclear power plants and, if applicable, for research reactor facilities, for which a construction licence is sought for the first time, that the competent regulatory authority obliges the applicant to demonstrate that the design practically limits the effects of a reactor core damage to within the containment.

(d) establishes and implements strategies to mitigate both design basis and beyond-design basis accidents;

(e) implements Severe Accident Management Guidelines for all nuclear power plants and, if appropriate, other nuclear installations, covering all operational conditions, accidents in the spent fuel pools and long-duration events;

(f) carries out a specific safety review for nuclear installations which the competent regulatory authority considers to be close to the limit of their operating lifetime as originally foreseen, and for which an extension of the lifetime is requested. ***Any measures mandated by the regulatory authority to prevent beyond-design basis accidents shall be implemented before an extension of lifetime is authorised.***

2. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the granting or the review of a licence to construct and/or operate a nuclear installation should be based upon an appropriate site- and installation-specific safety assessment ***including on-site inspections by the national authority.***

3. Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires, for nuclear power plants and, if applicable, for research reactor facilities, for which a construction licence is sought for the first time, that the competent regulatory authority obliges the applicant to demonstrate that the design practically limits the effects of a reactor core damage to within the containment.

Or. en

#### **Amendment 6**

**EPP, S&D, ALDE, ECR, GUE, EFD**

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 26, 160, 163  
Amendments 165, 166 fall

Amendments 161, 162, 164 voted as addition

**Proposal for a directive**

**Article 1 – point 10**

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 8d

*Text proposed by the Commission*

*Amendment*

On-site emergency preparedness and response

On-site emergency preparedness and response

Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the licence holder, under the supervision of the competent regulatory authority:

Member States shall ensure that the national framework requires that the licence holder, under the supervision of the competent regulatory authority:

(a) prepares and regularly updates an on-site emergency plan which shall:

(a) prepares and regularly updates, **at least every eight years**, an on-site emergency plan which shall:

(i) be based on an assessment of events and situations that may require protective measures on-site or off-site;

(i) be based on an assessment of events and situations that may require protective measures on-site or off-site;

(ii) be co-ordinated with all other bodies involved and shall draw on lessons learned from the feedback of experience from severe events, should they occur;

(ii) be co-ordinated with all other bodies involved and shall draw on lessons learned from the feedback of experience from severe events, should they occur;

(iii) address in particular events that could impact multiple units of a nuclear installation;

(iii) address in particular events that could impact multiple units of a nuclear installation;

(b) establishes the necessary organisational structure for clear allocation of responsibilities and ensures the availability of necessary resources and assets;

(b) establishes the necessary organisational structure for clear allocation of responsibilities and ensures the availability of necessary resources and assets;

(c) puts in place arrangements for co-ordinating on-site activities and co-operating with authorities and agencies responsible for emergency response throughout all phases of an emergency, that should be regularly exercised;

(c) puts in place arrangements for co-ordinating on-site activities and co-operating with authorities and agencies responsible for emergency response throughout all phases of an emergency, that should be regularly exercised;

(d) provides for preparedness measures for the workers on-site with regard to potential **abnormal events** and accidents;

(d) provides for preparedness measures for the workers on-site with regard to potential **incidents** and accidents;

(e) provides arrangements for cross-border and international cooperation, including pre-defined arrangements for receiving on-

(e) provides arrangements for cross-border and international cooperation, including pre-defined arrangements for receiving on-

site external assistance, if needed;  
(f) arranges for an on-site emergency response centre, sufficiently protected against natural hazards and radioactivity to ensure its habitability;

(g) takes protective measures in case of an emergency in order to mitigate any consequences for human health and for air, water and soil.

site external assistance, if needed;  
(f) arranges for an on-site emergency response centre, sufficiently protected against natural hazards and radioactivity to ensure its habitability ***in case of and throughout potential crisis management situations***;

(g) takes protective measures in case of an emergency in order to mitigate any consequences for human health and for air, water and soil.

Or. en

### **Amendment 7A**

**EPP, S&D, ALDE. Greens,**

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 27-30, 167, 170, 173, 180, 184, 185, 188 (2<sup>nd</sup> part), 189, 190, 194-198, 208, 209

Amendments 168, 169, 172, 174-179, 182, 183, 186-187, 191-193, 199, 201-204 fall

Amendments 181, 188 (1<sup>st</sup> part), 200, 205 to be voted as addition

AM 188 1st part : from "jointly define" to "point b)" and

AM 188 2nd part from "to which" to "participate" in fact all words after "point b)"

### **Proposal for a directive**

**Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11**

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 8e

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

Peer Reviews

1. Member States shall at least every ***ten*** years arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of any peer review shall be reported to the Member States and the Commission, when available.

#### *Amendment*

Peer Reviews

1. Member States shall at least every ***eight*** years arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of any peer review shall be reported to the Member States and the Commission, when available. ***The European Parliament shall be regularly informed about the results of the peer***

2. Member States, with the support of the competent regulatory authorities, shall periodically arrange, and at least every six years, a system of topical peer reviews and agree on a time-frame and the modalities for implementation. For this purpose Member States shall:

(a) jointly **and in close coordination with the Commission** select one or more specific topics related to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. Should Member States fail to jointly select at least a topic within the time frame specified in this paragraph, the Commission shall select the topics to be the subject of the peer reviews;

(b) **based on** these topics, perform in close collaboration with licence holders, national assessments and publish the results;

(c) jointly define a methodology, arrange and carry out a peer review of the results of the national assessments referred to in point (b), **to which the Commission is invited to participate**;

(d) publish the results of the peer reviews referred to in point (c).

3. Each Member State subject to **the peer review** referred to in paragraph 2 shall arrange for the planning and mode of implementation on its territory of relevant technical recommendations resulting from the peer-review process and **shall inform the Commission thereof**.

**reviews as well as about related measures and plans.**

2. Member States, with the support of the competent regulatory authorities, shall periodically arrange, and at least every six years, a system of topical peer reviews, and agree on a time-frame and the modalities for implementation. For this purpose Member States, **in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Regulator Group (ENSREG) as established by Decision 2007/530/Euratom**, shall:

(a) jointly select one or more specific topics related to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. Should Member States fail to jointly select at least a topic within the time frame specified in this paragraph, the Commission shall select the topics to be the subject of the peer reviews;

(b) **assess to what extent** these topics **have been addressed and, where needed**, perform in close collaboration with licence holders, national assessments **of the installations, to be evaluated by the competent regulatory authority** and publish the results;

(c) jointly define a methodology, arrange and carry out a peer review of the results of the national assessments referred to in point (b),

(d) publish the results of the peer reviews referred to in point (c).

**2a. The topic of the first topical peer review shall be decided not later than ...<sup>+</sup>**

3. Each Member State subject to peer **reviews** referred to in paragraph 2 shall **report the outcomes to all Member States and the Commission and** arrange for the planning and mode of implementation on its territory of relevant technical recommendations resulting from the peer-review process and **publish an action plan**

4. Should the Commission identify substantial deviations or delays in the implementation of the technical recommendations resulting from the peer review process, the Commission shall invite the competent regulatory authorities of Member States not concerned to organise and carry out a verification mission to get a full picture of the situation and inform the Member State concerned about possible measures to remedy any identified shortcomings.

5. In case of an accident *which leads to an early or large release* or an *abnormal event* leading to situations that would require off-site emergency measures or protecting measures for the public, the Member State concerned shall invite within six months a peer review of the installation concerned in accordance with paragraph 2, *and to which the Commission shall be invited to participate.*

*reflecting the steps taken.*

4. Should the Commission *in close coordination with ENSREG* identify substantial deviations or delays in the implementation of the technical recommendations resulting from the peer review process, the Commission shall invite the competent regulatory authorities of Member States not concerned to organise and carry out a verification mission to get a full picture of the situation and inform the Member State concerned about possible measures to remedy any identified shortcomings.

5. In case of an accident or an *incident* leading to situations that would require off-site emergency measures or protecting measures for the public, the Member State concerned shall invite within six months a peer review of the installation concerned in accordance with paragraph 2.

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<sup>+</sup>*Three years after the entry into force of the amending Directive.*

Or. en

#### **Amendment 7B ECR, EFD**

Compromise amendment replacing Amendments 27-30, 167, 173, 180, 184, 185, 188 (2<sup>nd</sup> part), 189, 190, 194-198, 204, 208, 209

Amendments 168, 169, 170, 172, 174-179, 182, 183, 186-187, 191-193, 199, 201-203 fall Amendments 181, 188 (1<sup>st</sup> part), 200, 205 to be voted as addition

AM 188 1<sup>st</sup> part : from "jointly define" to "point b)" and

AM 188 2<sup>nd</sup> part from "to which" to "participate" in fact all words after "point b)"

#### **Proposal for a directive**

#### **Article 1 – paragraph 1 – point 11**

Directive 2009/71/Euratom

Article 8e

Peer Reviews

1. Member States shall at least every ten years arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of any peer review shall be reported to the Member States *and* the Commission, when available.

2. Member States, with the support of the competent regulatory authorities, shall periodically arrange, and at least every six years, a system of topical peer reviews and agree on a time-frame and the modalities for implementation. For this purpose Member States shall:

(a) jointly *and in close coordination with the Commission* select one or more specific topics related to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations. *Should Member States fail to jointly select at least a topic within the time frame specified in this paragraph, the Commission shall select the topics to be the subject of the peer reviews;*

(b) *based on* these topics, perform in close collaboration with licence holders, national assessments and publish the results;

(c) jointly define a methodology, arrange and carry out a peer review of the results of the national assessments referred to in

Peer Reviews

1. Member States shall at least every ten years arrange for periodic self-assessments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities and invite an international peer review of relevant segments of their national framework and competent regulatory authorities with the aim of continuously improving nuclear safety. Outcomes of any peer review *and, where appropriate, of its follow-up* shall be reported to the Member States, the Commission *and the European Parliament*, when available.

2. Member States, with the support of the competent regulatory authorities, shall periodically arrange, and at least every six years, a system of topical peer reviews, and agree on a time-frame and the modalities for implementation. For this purpose Member States, *in the framework of the Nuclear Safety Regulator Group (ENSREG) as established by Decision 2007/530/Euratom*, shall:

(a) jointly select one or more specific topics related to the nuclear safety of nuclear installations;

(b) *assess to what extent* these topics *have been addressed and, where necessary*, perform in close collaboration with licence holders, national assessments *of the installations, to be evaluated by the competent regulatory* authority and publish the results;

(c) jointly define a methodology, arrange and carry out a peer review of the results of the national assessments referred to in

point (b), *to which the Commission is invited to participate*;

(d) publish the results of the peer reviews referred to in point (c).

3. Each Member State subject to *the* peer review referred to in paragraph 2 shall arrange for the planning and mode of implementation on its territory of relevant technical recommendations resulting from the peer-review process and *shall inform the Commission thereof*.

4. *Should the Commission identify substantial deviations or delays in the implementation of the technical recommendations resulting from the peer review process, the Commission shall invite the competent regulatory authorities of Member States not concerned to organise and carry out a verification mission to get a full picture of the situation and inform the Member State concerned about possible measures to remedy any identified shortcomings.*

5. In case of an accident *which leads to an early or large release* or an *abnormal event* leading to situations that would require off-site emergency measures or protecting measures for the public, the Member State concerned shall invite within six months a peer review of the installation concerned in accordance with paragraph 2, *and to which the Commission shall be invited to participate*.

point (b);

(d) publish the results of the peer reviews referred to in point (c).

*2a. The topic of the first topical peer review shall be decided not later than ...*<sup>+</sup>.

3. Each Member State subject to peer reviews referred to in paragraph 2 shall *report the outcomes to all Member States and the Commission and* arrange for the planning and mode of implementation on its territory of relevant technical recommendations resulting from the peer-review process and *publish an action plan reflecting the steps taken*.

4. *Each Member State subject to the peer review shall make available to other Member States, the Commission and the public a follow-up report on the implementation of recommendations after the peer review. If appropriate, a follow-up peer review shall then be organised under the same procedures as those described in paragraph 2 and its conclusions shall be made public.*

5. In case of an accident or an *incident* leading to situations that would require off-site emergency measures or protecting measures for the public, the Member State concerned shall invite within six months a peer review of the installation concerned in accordance with paragraph 2.

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<sup>+</sup>*Three years after the entry into force of the amending Directive.*

Or. en

## Amendment 8

EPP, S&D, ALDE. Greens, ECR, GUE, EFD

Compromise amendment replacing Amendment 75,

Amendment 74 falls

Amendment 76 voted as addition

## Proposal for a directive

### Recital 33

#### *Text proposed by the Commission*

(33) This Directive introduces new provisions on self-assessments and peer-reviews of nuclear installations based on selected nuclear safety topics covering their entire lifecycle. At an international level, there is already confirmed experience with conducting such peer-reviews on nuclear power plants. At the EU level, the experience from the stress tests process shows the value of a coordinated exercise to assess and review the safety of EU nuclear power plants. A similar mechanism, based on cooperation between the Member States' regulatory authorities and the Commission, should be applied here. **Therefore**, competent regulatory authorities coordinating in the context of **expert groups such as** ENSREG, could contribute with their expertise to identifying the relevant safety topics and in carrying out these peer reviews. If Member States fail to jointly select at least one topic the Commission should select one or more topics to be subject to the peer reviews. Participation of other stakeholders, such as Technical Support Organisations, international observers or non-governmental Organisations could bring added value to the peer reviews.

#### *Amendment*

(33) This Directive introduces new provisions on self-assessments and peer-reviews of nuclear installations based on selected nuclear safety topics covering their entire lifecycle. At an international level, there is already confirmed experience with conducting such peer-reviews on nuclear power plants. At the EU level, the experience from the stress tests process shows the value of a coordinated exercise to assess and review the safety of EU nuclear power plants. ***In its resolution of 14 March 2013 on risk and safety assessments ('stress tests') of nuclear power plants in the European Union and related activities, the European Parliament recalled that those stress tests had been limited in scope and could not be intended to replace the detailed safety reviews of nuclear installations which are carried out under the competence of Member States.*** A similar mechanism, based on cooperation between the Member States' regulatory authorities and the Commission ***in the framework of ENSREG***, should be applied here. Competent regulatory authorities coordinating in the context of ENSREG, could contribute with their expertise to identifying the relevant safety topics and in carrying out these peer reviews. If Member States fail to jointly select at least one topic the Commission should select one or more topics to be subject to the peer reviews. Participation of other stakeholders, such as Technical Support Organisations, international observers or non-

governmental Organisations could bring  
added value to the peer reviews.

Or. en